Chinese Communist Party’s overseas internet governance efforts frustrated, turning to bribe overseas influencers

Recent days, a document circulating on the internet labeled as an internal circulation within the Chinese Communist Party’s public security system has shown that the CCP has internally admitted that over the past half year, Chinese public opinion on overseas social media platforms has been displaying a trend towards decentralization and fragmentation. The effectiveness of the traditional approach of comprehensive external network governance and opinion guidance has been limited, prompting relevant departments to adjust their strategies and focus on targeted measures against influential accounts.

The circulating document indicates that the sources of recent Chinese dissenting voices on overseas social media platforms are no longer concentrated solely within traditional opposition media or organizations, but increasingly come from individual accounts, self-media, and issue-oriented opinion leaders. The document acknowledges that this shift has weakened the core working model centered around thematic placements and centralized guidance.

The document is considered an internal speech, and reporters are unable to further verify its authenticity. However, according to informed sources, the content aligns with the actual working situation. One source stated, “This material is genuine. Domestic internet governance has become extremely strict, with recent efforts focusing on cracking down on several prominent overseas internet celebrities who criticize the domestic situation. This is about precisely targeting well-known internet celebrities. If a soft approach doesn’t work, they will resort to harder methods.”

The document argues that some of the long-standing external public opinion work methods have formal issues, resulting in less than ideal communication effects. Some accounts listed as key targets of attention no longer pay attention to officially released information, and the resources invested have failed to produce the expected impact.

Based on these assessments, the document proposes shifting from pursuing “comprehensive coverage” on overseas social media platforms to adopting a “case-by-case, account-by-account” approach, focusing resources on addressing influential accounts and issues. Project teams are instructed to enhance targeting and coordination efficiency to avoid dispersed efforts.

Aside from the content of the document, recent reports about the CCP contacting overseas internet opinion leaders through third parties have sparked attention online. Multiple netizens have disclosed that some overseas “internet celebrities” were approached by individuals related to the CCP for so-called “collaborative communication,” and recordings and text messages related to these interactions have been leaked. circulated materials indicate that third parties have attempted to induce adjustments in the stances of overseas accounts on China-related issues by offering substantial rewards.

According to materials compiled and shared by multiple netizens, some internet celebrities from countries such as Japan and the United States who have previously publicly questioned the legitimacy of CCP rule or the Chinese political system have recently undergone noticeable shifts in content orientation. These accounts have started framing their content around “objective reporting” and “rational views on China,” emphasizing China’s economic development achievements and urging netizens to “comprehensively and accurately assess China’s current reality.” Such statements have sparked public skepticism.

Mr. Tian, a netizen from Hunan who frequently bypasses internet censorship, noted during a recent interview with reporters that he has observed this phenomenon for some time. He remarked, “Initially, I thought it was just a change in personal opinions, but later I noticed several accounts shifting their focus almost simultaneously, using similar language that emphasizes China’s economic achievements and development speed while rarely mentioning institutional issues. The consistency of this change makes it difficult not to suspect external influence.”

As of now, the sources and authenticity of the related audio recordings and text messages have not been independently verified, and the involved accounts have not issued any unified responses to these claims. The CCP has not publicly addressed whether they have engaged with overseas internet celebrities through third parties for collaboration.

Some analysts point out that amid intensifying competition in overseas Chinese public opinion, the CCP is adjusting its approach to external network governance, transitioning from widespread suppression to targeted handling of influential opinion leaders. Mr. Wang Ping, a retired professor from Lanzhou University, views this as a battle between the CCP and anti-authoritarian forces overseas for control over public opinion, which has become increasingly concealed and complex. He emphasized that ordinary netizens could easily be misled, and the true nature and impact of such developments still require observation.

Mr. Wang further remarked, “As more people in China bypass internet censorship, there is a growing disparity between the authorities’ portrayal of society and the actual sentiments of some citizens. Those who bypass censorship often develop new understandings, which is one of the factors that the authorities are highly vigilant about.”

According to sources familiar with the matter, the cybersecurity system has requested local-level internet security and public opinion departments to enhance their research on the operational mechanisms of overseas social media platforms and account ecosystems, improve interdepartmental collaboration, and instruct relevant personnel to proactively deal with more complex situations to enhance operational capabilities on the ground.

The source mentioned that this work is not a recent development. “Several months ago, various provinces and cities had already begun implementing related arrangements, primarily conducting reviews of local account holders who are more active overseas to categorize them according to their level of influence and take corresponding measures based on different circumstances.”

Mr. Gao, a long-term observer of ideological issues, believes that the CCP’s internal evaluation of the overseas public opinion environment has begun to shift. Compared to the past emphasis on narrative shaping and opinion guidance, the current strategy leans more towards risk control and targeted handling, indicating that while tightening control over online speech, the CCP’s regulatory boundaries are gradually extending overseas.