The White House’s release of the “National Security Strategy” has made the policy towards Taiwan clearer, shifting away from ambiguity to a more defined stance. The Monroe Doctrine endorsed by Trump aims to drive the influence of the CCP out of the American continent, marking the third major shift in relations among the United States, China, and Russia.
The latest National Security Strategy outlined by President Trump for his second term is considered one of the most crucial documents since the Cold War, as it reevaluates the international landscape post-Cold War and adjusts the strategic stance of the United States accordingly.
The Taiwan issue is a significant aspect of this national security strategy, providing the clearest description of the American position on Taiwan to date. It signifies a departure from past ambiguous policies, emphasizing Taiwan’s direct impact on US interests.
The strategy recognizes the importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry to the US, but the primary reason for the focus centers around Taiwan serving as a barrier to the second island chain, a key position within the first island chain separating Northeast and Southeast Asia into distinct strategic zones.
Essentially, the description highlights that if Taiwan were to fall, the CCP could advance through the second island chain, severing the link between the US and its Asian allies in the region. The target of this depiction is solely the CCP.
While the strategy does not explicitly state whether the US will defend Taiwan, the proposed solution is clear—it will rely on maintaining military superiority to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, establishing a military force capable of preventing aggression anywhere along the first island chain. This aligns with the strategy’s principle of “peace through strength.”
Furthermore, the strategy strengthens alliances and urges allies to contribute more to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, echoing Japanese Prime Minister Koga Soumou’s remarks about the situation in Taiwan. Specifically, it underscores that “due to President Trump’s insistence on Japan and South Korea increasing their responsibility-sharing, these countries must be urged to boost defense spending, focusing on the capabilities needed to deter adversaries and protect the first island chain.”
This segment is unprecedentedly clear: “Strengthening the efforts of the United States and its allies to prevent any seizure of Taiwan or the formation of a power balance that would be extremely detrimental to us, to the point where the ability to defend the island is compromised.”
The description concerning Taiwan dispels some previous misconceptions, partially caused by the US’s policy ambiguity towards Taiwan. For instance, despite Biden mentioning “co-defend Taiwan” on at least three occasions, each time it was promptly denied by the White House, explained away as unintentional slips of the tongue.
Wu Xinbo, Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, suggested that China intends to leverage agreements on rare earth exports and agricultural product purchases to seek further concessions from the US on Taiwan-related issues, such as demanding Washington openly declare “non-support for Taiwanese independence” and reduce arms sales to Taiwan, implying that the US has already made concessions.
Undoubtedly, China harbors such intentions, but the appropriate response from the US should be based on the official document, the “National Security Strategy.”
The “National Security Strategy” reinterprets the Monroe Doctrine, which was first articulated by President James Monroe in 1823 to advocate non-intervention by Europe in the Americas. By the 1850s, the “Monroe Doctrine” evolved, encapsulating the principles that Europe should cease colonization of any American state, the US could intervene in European affairs only if its interests were jeopardized, and any attempts by external powers to colonize the Americas would be considered a threat to US national security.
The Monroe Doctrine underwent a significant expansion when President Franklin Roosevelt extended it to assert that the Americas were within the US’s sphere of influence, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Trump’s recent addition redefines the doctrine once again, broadening the opposition to foreign interference in the Americas beyond Europe to include other non-Western hemisphere countries.
Though not explicitly named, it is evident that China and Russia play significant roles in this revised doctrine. For instance, the influence of the CCP is felt in the Panama Canal region, while Venezuela is primarily influenced by both Russia and China. China supports the Maduro government through oil financing and infrastructure projects, and Russia provides military technology and political protection, aiding Venezuela in countering US sanctions and maintaining regime stability.
The Trump administration’s military presence in Venezuela, enforced as a counter-narcotics operation, serves as a tangible implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in action.
This marks the most significant strategic reset for the US since the end of the Cold War, encompassing de-globalization, heightened attention and warnings to Europe, and an overall strategic reassessment with respect to China, among other aspects.
Let’s delve into the US-China-Russia relations. Since the end of World War II, there have been three major reversals in the trilateral relations among the US, China, and Russia.
The first reversal occurred in 1949 following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, primarily ideologically driven. China’s shift towards a pro-Soviet and anti-American stance under Mao Zedong marked a departure from the pro-American, anti-Russian (Soviet) policies of the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China. This shift was symbolized by Mao Zedong’s article “Farewell, John Leighton Steele.”
Subsequently, as Khrushchev denounced Stalin, Mao grew disillusioned with the Soviet Union and perceived a deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. This led to a rift with the Soviet Union and culminated in the famous 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, following Mao’s open critique of the Soviet Communist Party.
During the Cold War, the US, in need of countering the Soviet Union, initiated contact with China. This engagement paved the way for improved US-China relations, where National Security Advisors like Henry Kissinger and successive Presidents like Nixon visited China, fostering a united front against the Soviet Union. This marked the second major reversal in trilateral relations, which took nearly a decade to solidify. After the Cold War, China’s reform and opening-up policy aimed at reconciliation with the US, but the US did not undergo significant adjustments concerning the trilateral relations among the US, China, and Russia in politics and military spheres.
This recent shift marks the third reversal, which began in earnest during Trump’s first term and continues to evolve through various challenges and uncertainties till today.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War rendered the US-China alliance against the Soviet Union obsolete, calling for timely adjustments. However, China’s reform and opening-up policies blurred global perceptions, particularly in the US, delaying strategic realignments by over two decades. This delay ultimately resulted in significant outflow of American industries and jobs, primarily to China, prompting a critical reflection across various sectors in the US.
Trump’s success in the 2016 presidential election signifies a populist reaction borne out of this reflection. During Trump’s first term, strategic adjustments towards China began, while efforts to improve relations with Russia were hindered by the “RussiaGate” accusations.
Over the past four years, although there have been several geopolitical shifts like the Russia-Ukraine conflict and joint actions by China and Russia against the US, the US-China strategic landscape remained somewhat unchanged. The once relaxed relations between China and Russia escalated to an unlimited strategic partnership, strengthened by Xi Jinping’s 2023 visit to Russia and the joint statement on the “Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era.”
In essence, the third reversal in tripartite relations marks a transition from competition to potential confrontation between the US and China, with Russia playing a significant role. While the latest strategy no longer categorizes China as the “greatest challenge” or “primary adversary,” the threats posed by China to the US and the corresponding countermeasures have, if anything, intensified, with the most extensive section within the strategy focused almost entirely on China in the Asian context.
Through Trump’s mediation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there are signs of a thaw in US-Russia relations; however, the unique “beyond-alliance” partnership between China and Russia within the tripartite relations remains unaltered.
For Trump, the US-China-Russia relationship presents the most significant challenge to the reset of tripartite relations, although it may not drastically impact the US’s global strategic realignment this time around.
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy not only shapes the next three years of Trump’s second term but also sets the tone for the global landscape over the next several decades.