politics

New York Prosecutors Unveil Huawei’s Criminal Practices, Rejecting Claims of ‘Individual Employees’ Violations’

Published November 19, 2026 · Updated November 20, 2026 · 6 min read
BEIJING, CHINA – NOVEMBER 05: A worker stands in the window of a Huawei store in a commercial area on November 5, 2024 in Beijing, China. Later this week China’s government is expected to announce new fiscal measures aimed at boosting economic growth and consumer spending in the worlds second largest economy. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

In a high-profile criminal trial, federal prosecutors have rebutted the defense’s closing arguments concerning Huawei’s alleged operations of a criminal enterprise, theft of trade secrets from American companies, and misleading American banks. The trial proceedings, which have captivated the attention of many, took a decisive turn as prosecutors emphasized the extensive nature of Huawei’s alleged illegal activities, involving multiple employees, various departments, and numerous countries.

Prosecutors assert that Huawei’s actions cannot simply be dismissed as the work of a few “bad apples” within the company. Instead, they argue that these activities represent a broader criminal pattern that has been established at the highest levels of corporate leadership and executed by employees with a shared objective of gaining a competitive advantage in the marketplace.

Robert Pollack, an assistant federal prosecutor, stated that the defense’s portrayal of the case as overly complicated was an attempt to divorce the company’s overarching practices from the actions of its individual employees. He used a colloquial American phrase to mock the defense’s argument, asserting that Huawei’s circumstances were not akin to something that could simply “fall off a truck” without intention or recognition, suggesting a deliberate and calculated infringement of the law.

In a lengthy closing argument that lasted over six hours, Huawei’s chief defense attorney, Brian Heberlig, presented the prosecution’s allegations as isolated incidents selected from a large multinational company employing over 200,000 individuals and operating for more than three decades. He argued that employees implicated in alleged thefts involving Cisco, T-Mobile, and Fujitsu have either been fired or disciplined, and that disputes over cases related to CNEX and Quintel pertained to business cooperation rather than implicating Huawei in a 20-year-long criminal conspiracy.

Furthermore, Heberlig highlighted that Huawei maintains a compliance department with about 1,500 employees who receive mandatory training and testing. He pointed out that Huawei has paid $11 billion in technology patent fees to other companies over the years, demonstrating that it has achieved business success through legitimate research and innovation. He stressed that the prosecution had failed to establish a consistent criminal blueprint across the various incidents mentioned.

In response, Pollack contended that the mere existence of a compliance department does not absolve Huawei of wrongdoing. He asserted that the company’s leadership was fully aware of legal requirements but chose to knowingly violate laws. According to Pollack, Huawei’s compliance policies appeared to be largely superficial—essentially a façade. Businesses are required not only to ensure employee adherence to legal standards but also to prevent any unlawful conduct, whether it be employees crossing legal lines in pursuit of profit or otherwise jeopardizing the company’s integrity. He pointed out that, in many cases, top executives at Huawei were promoted even after committing violations.

Pollack further clarified that the prosecution’s case was built on more than just the isolated actions of a few employees. They provided the jury with internal documents, emails, and management decisions to demonstrate that these actions were undertaken with shared corporate intentions.

A significant point of contention was an internal memorandum dated 2013 titled “Standards for Collecting Competitive Intelligence.” This document detailed the rewards employees could receive for acquiring information of various degrees of confidentiality from competitors, which ranged from 2,000 to 200 yuan, and mandated that sensitive information be encrypted and sent to designated email addresses.

The defense argued that this memorandum was created as the result of inappropriate actions by a low-level sales manager and did not reflect official company policies. They claimed that the document faced opposition from senior management in the U.S. and that the responsible manager was subsequently terminated.

However, Pollack asserted that the significance of the memorandum did not rest on what transpired after its issue but rather on the fact that it was genuinely produced by the company and disseminated to global subsidiaries, clearly encouraging employees to gather confidential information from competitors. He regarded this memorandum as an important piece of evidence that reflects Huawei’s corporate culture, demonstrating that not only did the company allow its employees to collect competitive intelligence, but it also implemented a system to reward such activities.

Pollack also referenced various cases involving Huawei employees and competitors such as T-Mobile, Cisco, Fujitsu, Quintel, and CNEX. He indicated that the company had acquired competitive technological data through confidentiality agreements and business collaborations and that internal communications revealed corporate interests in obtaining CNEX’s solid-state drive technology to minimize research and development costs.

Another essential focal point of the prosecution’s rebuttal was whether Huawei’s management was aware of and engaged in fraudulent practices.

In relation to its operations in Iran, the defense argued that financial institutions like HSBC were already aware of Huawei’s dealings through Hong Kong-based Skycom and still chose to conduct business with the company. Therefore, the defense argued that Huawei had no need to deceive banks, and no evidence suggested that the company understood the associated U.S. dollar transactions would violate American sanctions.

Nevertheless, the prosecution referred back to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) signed by Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in 2021, which included facts acknowledging that Meng had provided false representations to HSBC regarding Huawei’s relationship with Skycom.

Pollack interpreted Meng’s statements as evidence that Huawei’s upper management was not uninformed about the associated business dealings. Even after admitting to the inaccuracies in her statements, Meng retained her position as CFO and even ascended to the role of rotating chairwoman. Additionally, Charles Ding, a senior vice president at Huawei, misled U.S. Congress regarding Huawei’s activities in Iran and has continued to occupy his position.

Assistant prosecutor Meredith Arfa previously emphasized that Ding did not merely stray from company policy but provided Congress with statements that aligned with Meng’s assertions made to the bank.

This interplay in the courtroom suggests that the issues surrounding Huawei are not limited to the actions of lower-level employees but implicate the company’s leadership in misleading banks, Congress, and the public, while upper management appears to evade accountability.

The prosecution also introduced further evidence in its closing arguments, noting that between 2008 and 2018, Huawei sent over $1.7 billion in net remittances from its operations in China to its U.S. subsidiary. The prosecution posited that these funds originated from Huawei’s overall business activities, presenting a link between illicit acts of theft, money laundering, and fraud as mechanisms to gain an advantage and generate revenue, which were later funneled back to support U.S. operations to acquire technology from American firms, thus establishing a direct connection between the alleged misconduct and Huawei’s corporate operations in the United States.

As the courtroom drama continues, the focal point ultimately rests on the struggle between the narrative of individual “bad apples” and the more systemic issues of corporate responsibility. The pivotal question emerges: have a few rogue employees stepped over the line, or does the company culture and systemic practices implicitly condone such behavior?

Jurors began their deliberations in closed session starting Thursday, tasked with deciding on the fourteen criminal charges faced by Huawei and its affiliated entities.