A recent report from Xinhua News Agency has announced that a public prosecution has been initiated against former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member Ma Xingrui, following allegations of bribery. Ma is accused of exploiting his various official positions—including Vice General Manager and General Manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee, Mayor of Shenzhen, Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee, Governor, and Politburo member—to obtain illicit gains for others, as well as illegally accepting substantial sums of money and property.
Ma Xingrui began his career with CASC in September 1999 when he was appointed as Vice General Manager. His activities came under scrutiny in April 2026 when the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection initiated an investigation. According to the report, Ma’s bribery offenses extended over a staggering period of 25 years.
This timeline indicates that Ma was continuously promoted even while he was engaged in corrupt practices, a phenomenon commonly referred to in the CCP as being “promoted with a disease.”
The key milestones in Ma Xingrui’s career, through which he was escalated despite these allegations, can be summarized as follows:
In March 2013, Ma was promoted to the position of Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology while concurrently serving as the Administrator of the China National Space Administration, the Director of the National Atomic Energy Agency, and the Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Industry Bureau. This marked a significant turning point in his career—an evaluation led by Zhao Leji, then a member of the Politburo, with the final decision made by Xi Jinping, who was the General Secretary of the Communist Party at that time.
On November 19, 2013, Ma transitioned to become the Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, a crucial turning point in his political journey. Again, Zhao Leji oversaw the examination, and Xi Jinping took the final decision.
By March 2015, in his continuing role as Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee, Ma was appointed Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee. This elevated him to the forefront of China’s economic reforms, receiving responsibilities that would resonate across the nation.
On December 30, 2016, Ma was again promoted—this time to Vice Governor of Guangdong Province, Acting Governor, and Party Committee Secretary. His record continued to expand as he took on leadership in one of China’s prosperous coastal provinces, with his assessment once more overseen by Zhao Leji and the final nod given by Xi Jinping.
On December 25, 2021, he obtained a significant position as the Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee, an influential role within this critical frontier region and a significant milestone in his political career, assessed by Chen Xi and finalized by Xi.
In October 2022, during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party, Ma’s trajectory culminated in his appointment as a member of the Party’s Politburo, marking him as an integral part of Xi Jinping’s central leadership framework.
Through this career tracing, it becomes evident that Xi Jinping bears primary responsibility for Ma Xingrui’s promotions and overall trajectory within the CCP.
In a vast country like China, there exists an abundance of talent among its officials. Ma is undoubtedly a capable figure; however, questions about his accelerated rise and the reasons behind his sustained success amidst a pool of other talents emerge, with three principal factors that may explain this phenomenon.
Firstly, Ma shares a hometown connection with Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping’s wife. Their families are reportedly longstanding acquaintances, with stories suggesting that they spent time together in their youth. After Peng became China’s First Lady, Ma became a frequent visitor to the Xi household. Reports in the Financial Times suggested that Ma frequently engaged with Xi’s family during Xi’s ascension, making him one of the closest high-ranking officials to Xi.
Moreover, some sources have alleged that Ma Xingrui facilitated a substantial deal in Shenzhen to benefit Xu Xingjian, Peng Liyuan’s brother-in-law, leading to the acquisition of loss-making assets at exorbitant prices. Shortly after this deal was closed, Ma was appointed as the Acting Governor of Guangdong Province, signifying a strategy that aligned with Xi’s intentions.
Other allegations indicate that while in Shenzhen, Ma maintained favorable business ties with Xi JinPing’s sister and brother-in-law, intervening in the high-profile Baoneng-Wanke conflict. In this case, Ma is said to have leveraged his influence to steer favorable outcomes for Wanke in negotiations, culminating in a successful defense against shareholder threats.
Ma Xingrui’s rise through the ranks post-2013 seems to follow a pattern of carefully orchestrated advancements directly linked to Xi JinPing’s directives. Within less than a decade, he has moved from vice-ministerial level to a deputy national level, benefiting from a diverse portfolio in both central ministries and key coastal provinces.
In light of all these developments, it appears that Ma’s investigation and eventual prosecution arose not out of Xi’s intent but rather as a result of factional infighting within the higher echelons of the CCP. The timeline reflects this reality, with Ma being dismissed from his position as Xinjiang Secretary in July 2025 before the official announcement of his investigation in April 2026.
The fact that Ma was dismissed signifies that the upper party leadership was already aware of his transgressions. However, Xi Jinping has a history of delaying action against those he has personally elevated—evident in other high-profile cases within the party.
As questions arise regarding whether Xi will accept accountability for Ma’s dubious rise through the party ranks, it seems unlikely that Xi will admit any fault or bear the responsibility for what many deem as a corrupt promotion system that he has overseen.
Since taking the role of General Secretary in 2012, all deputy provincial and ministerial-level officials under Xi who have faced investigation have been similarly “promoted with a disease.” If accountability were effectively pursued, Xi would have long faced pressure to resign.
Yet, under the autocratic system of “party leadership over everything” that the CCP maintains, there exists no mechanism for accountability. As long as this system remains unchanged, the CCP will undoubtedly find itself trapped in a vicious cycle, continually promoting individuals engaged in severe corruption while simultaneously conducting investigations into them.