A recent disclosure by an insider close to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) indicates that the dismissal of Zhang Youxia, the former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was not primarily due to the widely rumored power struggles within the military elite. Instead, the key issue appears to be his disagreements with President Xi Jinping over strategies related to Taiwan. According to this source, who goes by the pseudonym Tang Ming, Zhang had a deep understanding of the corruption within the military and recognized that the current system was ill-prepared to engage in a confrontation with Taiwan. He feared that any failure in such an endeavor would lead to an inability to shoulder the political responsibilities that would follow.
In the aftermath of the recently concluded Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the CCP expelled 33 senior officials from the party, government, and military sectors, with 16 of them originating from the military, including Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Zhang was placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law” at the end of January this year, though the official details surrounding his case remain vague, leading to speculations and rumors.
Tang Ming asserts that the reasons behind Zhang’s downfall are different from what has been propagated by external sources. He explains that the root of Zhang’s removal ties back to differing views on the Taiwan issue and acknowledges that, while tensions existed between Zhang and Xi, this did not translate into Zhang possessing any tangible capability to challenge Xi’s supremacy over military power.
“He’s not the type who is vying for military authority as many outside speculate,” Tang remarked. “That kind of power is not something he could ever control.”
Tang elaborated on Zhang’s long-standing career in military roles, noting his involvement in consolidating personnel networks during the era marked by the purges of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Zhang also found himself enmeshed in the political upheaval involving higher military officials such as Miao Hua. However, he opines that these discrepancies are less about a personal contest of power between Zhang and Xi and more about rival factions within the military itself.
“The struggles we see are typically among equals vying for power, rather than Zhang directly contesting Xi’s control. At the moment Zhang showed any signs of rising too prominently, Xi moved quickly to eliminate him.”
Tang emphasizes that the significant rift between Zhang and Xi centers around the military’s operational readiness and capability concerning Taiwan. During his tenure overseeing military equipment, Zhang reportedly became acutely aware of the extent of corruption plaguing military procurement and the reliability of weapon systems, leading him to possess a pessimistic outlook on the military’s ability to effectively engage in combat missions involving Taiwan.
“I mean, there are significant issues with missile launch vehicles and fuel procurement, among other facets,” Tang noted.
“He does not advocate for military action because he is genuinely concerned about the Taiwan issue—he isn’t. He understands that the current military framework is simply not equipped to confront Taiwan.”
While Zhang is not fully dismissive of the Chinese military’s potential to initiate an attack on Taiwan, he does harbor concerns regarding the ramifications of an escalated conflict if countries like the United States and Japan were to intervene. He fears that the CCP could struggle under the burden of a protracted military campaign.
“Can China’s weaponry effectively engage Taiwan? Yes, it can. But if Japan, the U.S., and other nations support Taiwan, then it wouldn’t be able to sustain long-term warfare.”
“If a conflict drags on like it did in Russia, the CCP would falter in just two years.”
Tang believes Zhang holds a comprehensive understanding of the internal issues plaguing the military, which leads to his reluctance to bear the political fallout from any potential war failure.
“Currently, he is the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, but if China were to lose, would he retain that position? Wouldn’t he be accountable?”
“The crux of Zhang’s predicament is that he knows the extent of corruption both in his ranks and across the military; he realizes he cannot effectively perform in this role. Thus, he resists, as he knows that if he engages and things go awry, he could be exposed.”
The revelations regarding Zhang’s stance on military action towards Taiwan, his internal assessments, and his disagreements with Xi Jinping stem from the leak of insider information about the military’s circumstances, and cannot yet be verified through publicly accessible data.
However, the impact of rampant corruption within the CCP military establishment on its operational effectiveness has already drawn international scrutiny. In January 2024, Bloomberg reported that insiders familiar with U.S. intelligence assessments indicated serious corruption within the Chinese Rocket Force and the military-industrial complex, raising concerns about the reliability of missile systems and launch facilities, potentially undermining Beijing’s capacity to execute significant military operations.
These reports do not substantiate any conclusions regarding Zhang’s individual motivations.
Tang further suggests that the ongoing large-scale purges within the Chinese military and defense sectors in recent years are not limited to procurement-related corruption but encompass leaks of military intelligence as well. He asserts that there have been instances where critical information concerning rocket forces and nuclear weapon systems was funneled to the United States.
“This isn’t merely about procurement; that is a minor issue. Transmitting critical information, especially regarding nuclear capabilities and missiles, is of far graver significance.”
He implicates that interactions between the Chinese military-industrial complex and international business networks may pose risks of sensitive technical and procurement information leakage. “In the course of monetizing deals, partnerships may emerge through which critical information inevitably leaks.”
Tang also casts suspicion on certain officials who might have fallen prey to foreign infiltration during commercial engagements, military procurements, and personal relationships.
He draws connections between Huawei and the ousted Ma Xingrui in terms of their engagements in aerospace, communications, and military sectors.
“I previously mentioned that the connections between Huawei and Ma Xingrui are substantial, especially involving families.”
He suggests that during the phase when Huawei communication equipment was widely utilized by the military and local governments, there existed a significant risk of related military and governmental information leaking through such networks of interest.
In addition to the implications for Ma Xingrui and Zhang Youxia, there has been a recent trend of high-level personnel changes within the Chinese military-industrial sector.
The 20th Central Committee of the CCP, which concluded on October 29, confirmed the expulsion of several officials with ties to state-owned military enterprises, including Yuan Jie, Wen Gang, Lei Fanpei, and Zhang Zhongyang.
Yuan Jie previously served as Chairman of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, while Wen Gang and Lei Fanpei held successive positions as Chairmen of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.
Some of these officials had already vacated their leadership roles years prior, but only during this recent party congress was there a public acknowledgment regarding punitive actions taken against them.
When questioning the prolonged secrecy surrounding issues involving certain military officials, Tang attributed it to factors such as the political status of those involved, the scope of the cases’ implications, and the investigative pace of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
“For the CCP, some members are deemed unimportant or have minimal political influence. Their policy influence may not be notable, and thus sometimes their issues do not warrant immediate reporting.”
He explained that issues concerning Central Committee members and alternate members often undergo extended periods of investigation, inquiry, or interrogation. Authorities might not promptly implement coercive measures or disclose relevant details.
“Some individuals have issues; the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is checking, assessing, and once these issues are found, they can range from significant to minor. They can be addressed now or left unresolved at this time.”
Additionally, investigations may involve higher-level officials, leading to further delays in the inquiry process. “There’s also the chance that your issues could implicate larger individuals down the line.”
Tang disclosed that recently, another serving minister-level official has been taken away for questioning, with some of their family members also caught up in the fallout.
“In recent days, another minister has been placed under double regulation; this has not yet been publicly disclosed as the case is still being sorted out.”
He indicated that the position of this official is of significant importance, and the situation remains under scrutiny, with names reserved for future disclosure pending further information.
Insiders believe that in a heavily centralized power structure, corruption can serve as a long-term leverage point against officials, while the timing and scope of accountability may vary with the shifting political landscape from higher authorities.
As purges continue leading up to the CCP’s 21st National Congress, it remains to be seen whether they will conclude solely with figures such as Ma Xingrui and Zhang Youxia or potentially unravel wider networks of power and interests.