On November 6, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China passed a new law titled the “Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law,” effective immediately. This legislation marks a significant move by the Chinese government to streamline its mechanisms for pursuing corruption cases involving assets abroad, integrating overseas asset recovery into a permanent framework coordinated by the National Supervisory Commission. Additionally, it tightens regulations concerning foreign entities investigating and gathering evidence within China.
Experts warn that under this new law, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may exploit the mechanism to probe into the overseas assets of officials who have lost power, as well as to provide new grounds for exerting political pressure on dissidents living abroad.
This law follows the 20th Central Committee’s Fifth Plenary Session, held in late October, which reiterated Beijing’s commitment to “strictly govern the Party” and saw numerous officials expelled from the Party. The passage of the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law during the 25th session of the Standing Committee serves as a legislative complement to the policies that emphasize internal discipline within the Party.
Wang He, a China specialist, highlighted that one of the motivations behind this expanded investigation authority is to curb capital flight, especially the potential outbound flow of state assets through illicit means. He pointed out that previous anti-corruption campaigns, such as “Operation Fox Hunt” and “Sky Net,” were project-based. This recent move consolidates fragmented regulations concerning foreign affairs and departmental obligations, led by the National Supervisory Commission, allowing for information sharing among police, finance, auditing, and anti-money laundering departments.
Senior commentator Heng He noted the unusual aspect of the law taking effect on the same day of its passage, unlike past practices. He speculated that this urgency may indicate a response to specific individuals or cases, implying that insufficient legal frameworks existed previously to penalize certain behaviors necessitating new legislation.
Former prosecutor Shen Liangqing linked the timing of the law to the reaffirmation of strict Party governance during the CCP’s 20th Plenary Session, viewing it as a legislative support for party policy. He explained that with the absence of extradition agreements, the CCP typically negotiates on a case-by-case basis, which limits the effectiveness of such actions.
Prior to the enactment of this law, authorities sought foreign assistance through existing supervisory laws to extradite suspects and recover involved assets. Post-enactment, the classification of suspected conduct as criminal will still rely on the CCP’s criminal law framework.
According to the Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency in a report at the end of February, the CCP had formally investigated 505 cross-border corruption cases by 2025 and successfully repatriated 963 fugitives through operations like “Sky Net.”
Wang He described the CCP’s selective anti-corruption efforts as based on personal loyalty rather than objective misconduct, stating, “It’s how you’re perceived rather than what you’ve done.” He opined that, within the framework of the CCP-led anti-corruption campaign, political allegiance will likely sway who is prosecuted and who is shielded. He raised concerns that leads regarding protected officials’ overseas assets may be dismissed under the guise of confidentiality while Beijing could mobilize more departments to scrutinize the financial activities of political adversaries.
Legal expert Zhang Ting (pseudonym) traced these issues back to the manner in which the CCP formulates laws. He characterized the law as resembling a “family rule” rather than a democratic legal process, asserting that public input and genuine authorization are frequently absent in such legislative endeavors. The formulation and implementation of laws, in his view, are often driven by the need to maintain CCP power and shield privileged classes.
Zhang believes that under the CCP system, unless a case intersects with internal power struggles, the new law might have limited effects on current or retired officials and their families. He emphasized that the corruption stemming from a lack of power checks cannot simply be addressed through additional legislation, describing current anti-corruption as a means of political cleansing intertwined with power struggles.
Shen Liangqing referred to the intertwining of anti-corruption with power rivalries and selective enforcement as a “systemic ailment.” He asserted that while the new law may impose some restrictions on officials and their families concerning the transfer of contested assets abroad, the foundational issue of unchecked public power persists.
Wang He emphasized that with enhanced collaboration among financial, auditing, and anti-money laundering sectors, authorities will find it easier to track the financial trails of mid-level officials and state-owned enterprise executives who have fled. If the countries harboring these assets are cooperative, the potential for freezing these assets increases significantly.
Regarding high-ranking officials and their families, he opined that the new law’s constraints would be “very limited.” He noted that even if assets are registered under a relative’s name, the retrieval process involves intricate legal barricades. Investigations within China must be initiated to clarify the nexus between the assets and illicit gains, while the overseas acknowledgment and recovery must comply with local legal procedures.
Wang also stated that Beijing might seek the assistance of nations with closer ties, particularly in parts of the Middle East or Southeast Asia, to freeze involved assets. In contrast, Heng He stressed that cases that foreign countries were reluctant to assist with may not shift merely due to the new law.
The European Court of Human Rights had previously ruled in 2022 against Poland’s intention to extradite a suspect accused of transnational telecom fraud to China, citing a legitimate risk of inhumane treatment and determining that such an extradition would violate the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, INTERPOL has made it clear that whether nations act on a red notice remains contingent upon their respective legal frameworks.
The new law allows Beijing to take countermeasures when identifying improper extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by foreign entities that harm Chinese interests and mandates foreign parties to conduct anti-corruption enforcement investigations in China, requiring Chinese consent for local entities to provide relevant evidence or information.
Shen Liangqing pointed out that while the CCP demands that enterprises operating abroad enhance compliance, it simultaneously restrains foreign governments’ investigations into Chinese companies and officials through its countermeasures. Wang He used the example of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to highlight that if a foreign entity requests documents from a multinational company operating in China, that firm could face conflicting demands from both sides, representing an escalation in judicial tensions between the U.S. and China.
Chinese democracy advocate Wang Dan discussed similar concerns in a podcast where he noted that if international firms’ headquarters needed to audit transactions abroad, they would face conflicting demands for auditing materials from Chinese regulatory authorities citing anti-cross-border corruption. He stressed that local teams may find it arduous to comply with both sets of requirements.
Heng He drew attention to previous instances of overseas coercion that included surveillance, threats, or pressuring family members within China to secure the return of individuals. He expressed worries that the new law would facilitate Beijing in presenting such operations as legitimate anti-corruption enforcement.
The United States Department of Justice, in a press release in April 2025, announced a conviction for a former New York police officer, Michael McMahon, who participated in “Operation Fox Hunt.” He was sentenced to 18 months in prison for illegally acting as an agent of the Chinese government and for interstate stalking.
Wang Dan also expressed concern that the new law cloaks controversial overseas actions in a legal facade. He questioned how the law encompasses behaviors occurring abroad while affecting similar corrupt activities within China, potentially leaving room for expansive interpretations by law enforcement. Examples such as political donations, charitable contributions, and academic exchanges were cited to highlight how the authorities might delineate between legitimate financial transactions and illicit dealings.
Lastly, he warned that the authorities could initiate investigations into financial interactions between overseas dissidents and family members in China, categorizing individuals as relevant parties in cases, and applying economic pressures through investigations. In Wang Dan’s view, this uncertainty may foster a chilling effect among individuals concerned about potential repercussions.