On November 4, 2026, the Standing Committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) officially revoked the CPPCC membership of former police commander General Wang Ning and three others. Wang was also dismissed from his position as a Standing Committee member and Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Notably, the official announcement did not refer to Wang using the title “comrade,” which is often interpreted as an indication of serious disciplinary or legal violations.
Wang Ning’s disqualification from the CPPCC membership marks a troubling trend, as he becomes the third commander of the Armed Police Force to face disciplinary action following the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The previous commanders, Wang Jianping (who served from December 2009 to December 2014) and Wang Chunning (from December 2020 to July 2025), also encountered similar issues. Wang Jianping was placed under investigation on December 29, 2016, while Wang Chunning was dismissed just before the 4th Plenary Session of the CCP in October 2025.
Intriguingly, Wang Jianping had been implicated in the “March 19 coup” orchestrated by former Politburo Standing Committee member and Security Chief Zhou Yongkang. In contrast, Wang Ning is part of the CCP’s “red second generation,” having strong connections to the ruling group led by Xi Jinping, the Party General Secretary. Wang Ning rose through the ranks and was promoted to the rank of General, serving as the commander of the Armed Police Force for six years, during which he played an instrumental role in Xi’s purges and consolidation of control over the police forces. The events surrounding Wang Ning’s recent downfall have sparked considerable speculation about internal power struggles within the upper echelons of the CCP and the ongoing purge within the military.
Wang Ning was born in 1955 in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, into a military family. His father held a position in the Nanjing Military Region, and his father-in-law, Du Ping, was one of the first generals to be promoted to two-star rank after the establishment of the People’s Republic. His uncle, General Gu Hui, was a former commander in the Nanjing Military Region.
After joining the army in 1970, Wang served over two decades in the Nanjing Military Region and participated in operations against Vietnam. In 1994, he transferred to the 31st Group Army based in Fujian Province, where he held several key positions, including the commander of its air defense brigade and deputy chief of staff. Wang became the chief of staff of the Shanghai Garrison in December 2003 and the commander of the Jiangxi Military District in November 2006. In November 2007, he returned to the 31st Group Army as the commander and eventually transitioned to the Beijing Military Region’s chief of staff in December 2010.
Xi Jinping, known for his lengthy tenure in Fujian from 1985 to 2002, developed strong ties with military leaders, especially during his time as deputy mayor of Xiamen, secretary of the Ningde Prefectural Committee, and governor of Fujian Province. Throughout this period, he held various military positions, maintaining a close connection with the 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian.
According to reports from the Fujian Daily, in June 2002, Xi, as the provincial governor, visited the 31st Group Army to address issues regarding the construction of a new office building.
In a report by the People’s Daily on August 1, 2014, it was noted that Xi visited military personnel in Fujian shortly before China’s Army Day. The report highlighted that Xi had visited the 31st Group Army’s units 12 times to express his concerns for the troops. On July 30, 2014, Xi made another visit to this same unit.
Interestingly, precisely one day earlier, on July 29, 2014, Zhou Yongkang was publicly announced to be under investigation. Xi’s appearance at the 31st Group Army during such a sensitive time indicated a show of military strength. This revealed the 31st Group Army as a crucial supporting force for Xi amid fierce power struggles within the CCP.
Wang Ning served in the 31st Group Army from 1994 to December 2003, overlapping with Xi Jinping’s time in Fujian by eight years.
After Xi came to power in the 18th National Congress, many leaders from the 31st Group Army received unprecedented promotions during military reforms and personnel adjustments, positioning themselves in key military roles.
In July 2013, 57-year-old Wang Ning was promoted from chief of staff of the Beijing Military Region to deputy chief of general staff, setting a record as the youngest in that position. By December 2014, he switched roles with General Wang Jianping to become the commander of the Armed Police Force while also being appointed as a member of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, retaining this position until his retirement in December 2020. During this timeframe, he was elevated to the rank of General in the Armed Police Force on July 31, 2015.
In February 2021, Wang was appointed as the deputy director of the National People’s Congress’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. Following the 20th CCP National Congress, in March 2023, he transitioned to the role of deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC.
Shortly after Wang assumed command of the Armed Police Force, the Central Military Commission initiated a series of inspections beginning in early February 2015 to assess the Armed Police’s leadership and their members. At that time, overseas media reported that the inspections were primarily focused on Wang Jianping and his associates.
Wang Jianping was subsequently investigated in late December 2016, marking the first active general to be ensnared in corruption since the 18th National Congress. Previous generals, including Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and Tian Xiusi, were investigated after their retirements.
In October 2016, Niu Zhizhong, a candidate member of the CCP Central Committee and deputy commander of the Armed Police Force, was expelled from the Party.
Around the same period, several high-ranking officers within the Armed Police, including former commander Liu Zhanqi and former political commissar Wang Xin, were also dismissed, indicating a broader sweeping of the ranks.
The internal struggles within the CCP have intensified under Xi Jinping’s leadership since he initiated military reforms. Before Wang Ning’s appointment, the Command of the Armed Police Force traditionally operated under a dual leadership system with both the State Council and the Central Military Commission. After Wang took command, he became the executor of these military reforms.
In December 2017, the CCP issued a directive adjusting the leadership and command structure of the Armed Police. Effective January 1, 2018, the Armed Police Unit fell under the unified leadership of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, effectively severing its tie with the State Council. Command authority for the Armed Police was thus centralized within the Military Commission.
Wang was also charged with implementing various cuts within the Armed Police, withdrawing active-duty personnel that were previously overseen by State Council departments, and integrating the Coast Guard under the Armed Police’s command while reassigning civil duties—like those of the gold, forest, and hydropower units—to relevant state departments, transitioning them into non-active professional brigade units. By January 1, 2019, all Armed Police personnel previously managed by police border defense and guards were retired and transitioned into police service frameworks.
The Armed Police Force has functioned as a secondary armed force outside the CCP’s military. During Jiang Zemin’s era, the Armed Police became a primary means for suppressing the Chinese populace, maintaining strong control under Zhou Yongkang during Hu Jintao’s administration.
In February 2012, following the escape of Wang Lijun, then deputy mayor of Chongqing, to a U.S. consulate, various media reported that Bo Xilai dispatched armed police and dozens of police vehicles, including armored cars, to surround the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu.
In March 2012, shortly after the CCP’s Two Sessions, Bo Xilai was dismissed as the Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee. Just four days later, on March 19, 2012, witnesses reported seeing military vehicles lining Chang’an Avenue and heightened security at the airport, along with gunfire from inside Zhongnanhai, leading to speculation that a significant crisis was unfolding in Beijing.
The events of the “March 19 incident” were characterized by some as a failed coup plotted by Zhou Yongkang, aiming to seize a critical witness in the Bo Xilai case and potentially harm former Premier Wen Jiabao.
Reports indicated that Zhou mobilized a large contingent of the Armed Police to encircle key government buildings, prompting Hu Jintao to deploy the 38th Army to Beijing. A standoff ensued between army soldiers and the armed police outside the Political and Legal Affairs Committee building, with the police firing warning shots. However, the 38th Army quickly disarmed the armed police, with numerous residents reporting hearing gunfire that night.
At that time, the Armed Police Force was commanded by Wang Jianping, a general who had ties to Xu Caihou, a former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Reports have suggested that Wang Jianping played a role in Zhou Yongkang’s orchestration of the “March 19 coup.”
The intersections of the Armed Police units and the internal strife within the upper echelons of the CCP are deeply embedded, particularly after Xi Jinping’s ascent. He appointed his trusted general Wang Ning from the 31st Group Army to lead the Armed Police Force, overseeing both purges and military reforms within this unit, thus demonstrating Wang’s position of trust within Xi’s administration.
In recent years, the internal conflicts and purges within the CCP military have escalated dramatically, leading to the downfall of senior officials who originated from the 31st Group Army, including Wang Ning and high-ranking allies of Xi like Miao Hua and He Weidong. Simultaneously, whispers circulated regarding the possibility of former allies of Zhang Youxia, the vice-chairman of the Military Commission, taking command of the Armed Police, indicating an ongoing struggle against Xi’s faction.
However, after the arrest of Zhang Youxia and Military Commission member Liu Zhenli in January 2026, it remains to be seen how Wang Ning and others from the 31st Group Army will navigate the unfolding crises.
The ongoing purges within the military, particularly involving senior generals from Xi’s trusted 31st Group Army, combined with the consecutive involvement of three past commanders of the Armed Police, may suggest a deeper layer of power struggles and challenges to Xi’s military authority than previously understood.