On November 6, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China approved the new “Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law.” This legislation not only expands China’s authority to pursue fugitives and recover stolen assets outside the country but also strictly prohibits foreign organizations from conducting anti-corruption investigations on Chinese soil without prior approval from Chinese authorities. Additionally, the law includes stringent requirements for Chinese law enforcement personnel to uphold confidentiality regarding national secrets and personal privacy during investigations.
Chen Pokong, a Chinese writer residing in the United States, believes that this law is not designed for genuine anti-corruption efforts but rather serves to protect the overseas assets of high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and their families, while also sidestepping foreign judicial investigations. Under the current CCP-led judicial system, the targets of anti-corruption initiatives are determined by the highest powers, making selective enforcement difficult to change.
The Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law consists of six chapters and 47 articles, as reported by Xinhua News Agency. This new law will take effect upon its announcement. It stipulates that the National Supervision Commission will lead the establishment of a mechanism for combating cross-border corruption, with cooperation from various sectors, including foreign affairs, public security, justice, financial regulation, and cyber governance.
The new legislation categorizes cross-border corruption into five types of conduct, ranging from bribery of foreign public officials to instances where Chinese entities engage in embezzlement, bribery abroad, and the abuse of power. It also addresses cases where corrupt individuals escape the country, along with the flight of assets. However, the law lacks clarity on the specific boundaries of certain investigative powers.
To understand the significance of this new law, it is essential to compare it with existing mechanisms for pursuing fugitives.
During an interview on November 7, Chen Pokong stated that establishing this new law appears to be an attempt to generate a greater momentum for anti-corruption in light of existing measures such as “Operation Fox Hunt,” “Sky Net,” and collaborations with Interpol.
He emphasized that genuine anti-corruption efforts should be institutionalized with a foundation of democracy, press freedom, and judicial independence. “CCP officials believe that ordinary people don’t understand; as long as there are people addressing corruption, that is sufficient,” he remarked.
According to Chen, the CCP uses this law to solidify Xi Jinping’s ruling authority while catering to segments of the populace that favor the image of a “clean official.” Many see Xi’s crackdown on corrupt officials but fail to comprehend the systemic issues at play behind corruption.
The new law’s Articles 13 to 15 mandate enhanced monitoring of cross-border financial movements and require the integration of supervisory information using big data and artificial intelligence. Supervisory and public security sectors are also granted the power to impose exit restrictions and engage in international cooperation to query financial accounts, freeze assets, search residences, and apprehend involved individuals.
Chen Pokong argues that without institutional oversight, press freedom, and judicial independence, anti-corruption efforts will not address systemic corruption effectively.
He pointed out that the sensitivity of this law lies in its implications for the overseas assets of high-ranking CCP officials and their families. Article 15 stipulates that relevant agencies and their personnel have a confidentiality obligation regarding national secrets, work secrets, commercial secrets, personal privacy, and personal information learned during anti-cross-border corruption activities.
Chen expressed concern that these provisions could become tools for limiting investigations and information disclosure. He cited the Jinping family, mentioning the overseas assets of Xi Jinping’s sister, brother-in-law, brother, and nephew in countries such as Canada and Australia, along with luxury properties in Hong Kong. Previously, such overseas assets had been revealed in the Panama Papers and through international investigative journalism.
He raised a critical question: “For instance, if investigators examine cases that involve the domestic and foreign assets of Xi Jinping’s family, would they dare to proceed with the investigation? Issues of corruption might be considered national secrets under this new law, falling under party-state confidentiality, obligating investigators to maintain secrecy.”
Xi Jinping once stated, “Be it east, west, south, north, the Party leads everything.” Chen concluded that the decision to investigate CCP officials or to pursue accountability for their overseas assets ultimately lies with the top party authority, not through judicial processes.
The law is specific in its monitoring requirements. Article 12 emphasizes the necessity of closely monitoring public officials who obtain foreign nationality or long-term residence permits abroad, as well as refining the reporting system for their overseas deposits and investments.
Chen provided an example: should investigators discover that other senior officials also have overseas assets during their investigations but have not received authorization to continue their inquiries or disclose these findings, they could face penalties for violating party discipline.
He argued that this indicates the law primarily targets mid- to lower-ranking officials and is unlikely to reach members of the Politburo Standing Committee or state leaders. Even if high-ranking officials are investigated, it would likely stem from power struggles or political maneuvering rather than genuine anti-corruption enforcement.
He noted that among retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee, only Zhou Yongkang has faced investigation; others have not been subjected to comparable scrutiny.
As for current Politburo member Li Xi, Chen speculated that he may be involved in severe corruption and has ties with Ma Xingrui, but whether an investigation will proceed still depends on Xi Jinping’s political decisions.
He referenced Zhang Gaoli, a former member of the Standing Committee, who came under international scrutiny due to the Peng Shuai incident but has not faced any consequences. Chen believes Zhang’s lack of investigation is linked to his earlier political support for Xi Jinping during constitutional amendments and Xi’s continued presidency.
He stressed that CCP anti-corruption initiatives are not conducted per a unified legal standard but instead are dictated by the highest authorities over whom investigations are launched.
“Hence, I view CCP anti-corruption as always being inauthentic, operating under the party’s leadership and Xi’s guidance. It is, as I said, selective anti-corruption serving the purpose of power struggles,” he asserted.
In addition to questioning domestic enforcement levels, the law’s stance towards foreign judicial bodies has also garnered significant attention.
The new legislation explicitly restricts foreign organizations from conducting investigations in China. Article 25 states that without the consent of the relevant Chinese authority, foreign organizations and individuals are prohibited from independently carrying out anti-corruption investigations within Chinese territory. Domestic organizations and individuals are equally prohibited from providing evidence, data, or relevant assistance to overseas entities without authorization.
Moreover, the law stipulates that should foreign countries use anti-corruption as a pretext for improper extraterritorial jurisdiction against China, China may resort to countermeasures following the “Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law,” among others.
Chen posits that the central purpose of this provision is to prevent foreign judicial institutions from investigating overseas assets and family interests of high-ranking CCP officials.
He believes that the CCP aims to use domestic laws to limit foreign inquiries, thwarting any potential judicial scrutiny that officials and their families may face abroad.
Using the recent Yang Lanlan incident in Australia as an example, he argued that the context surrounding that event remains unresolved, yet such controversies may exacerbate the CCP leadership’s anxiety regarding exposed overseas assets.
“To summarize, the CCP wishes for foreign governments to cooperate in pursuing fugitives and recovering stolen assets but is unwilling to collaborate with foreign judicial entities investigating CCP officials and their families,” he concluded.
Chen sees this dual standard as a manifestation of the CCP’s self-centered political logic: demanding that foreign countries align with its enforcement actions, including transnational repression, while perceiving foreign inquiries as interference in China’s domestic affairs.
Regarding how far this new law may reach internationally, Chen shares his perspective.
He indicates that mature democratic nations with established rule of law will not accept rules set unilaterally by the CCP and are unlikely to easily comply with demands to investigate officials and their overseas assets, viewing these requests instead as extensions of political conflicts.
“Countries that are likely to engage in relevant cooperation with the CCP are primarily in Central Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa.” However, he warns that such collaborations may not be based on principles of judicial fairness. The CCP might leverage financial incentives or other interests to compel these nations to apprehend specific individuals, hand over fugitives, or recover assets.
“Through bribery abroad, the CCP seeks to resolve power struggles, while internal corruption potentially exports new forms of corrupt practices,” Chen further cautioned, emphasizing that such collaborations could inadvertently foster new corruption.
Chen strongly advocates that to create a genuinely effective anti-corruption mechanism, it is essential to abandon one-party rule and establish a democratic system that empowers citizens with the right to vote, alongside guaranteeing press freedom and judicial independence.