As the date for the announcement of the results of the 47th presidential election in the United States draws near, both parties in the U.S. are increasingly viewing the Chinese Communist regime as their biggest competitor or greatest threat. The leaders in Beijing are closely monitoring the election situation. Analysts believe that the Chinese authorities may convene an early Fourth Plenum in response to the outcome of the U.S. election to adjust their strategies towards the U.S. Some experts hold differing views on whether Xi Jinping currently lacks a “China expert” by his side.
On November 5th, Trump and Biden’s replacement candidate, He Jinli, will compete for the U.S. presidency. It is generally believed that regardless of who wins, the tense relationship between the U.S. and China is unlikely to see significant improvement.
At the recent Democratic National Convention, He Jinli pledged to defeat the Chinese Communist Party in the 21st century, and Republican Presidential nominee Trump has also expressed a similar desire.
The Biden administration, like the Trump administration, is committed to containing trade with China, but Biden’s approach is more targeted. Biden seeks to focus on specific strategic areas such as renewable energy, key materials, semiconductors, and healthcare products.
He Jinli’s public statements indicate that she aligns with the Biden administration on trade issues.
Lai Rongwei, executive director of the Taiwan Inspirational Association (TIA), told Epoch Times that the Chinese Communist Party may prefer the Democratic Party’s candidate to win. He believes that the Biden administration has a long history of avoiding risks and maintaining dialogue with the official Chinese authorities, which is likely to continue under He Jinli’s potential presidency. In comparison, the unpredictability of Trump’s policies after being elected surpasses that of the Democratic Party.
Gong Xiangsheng, a deputy researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, told the Epoch Times that Trump has expressed a deterrent view towards the Chinese Communist regime and initiated the U.S.-China trade war, which Beijing may not favor Trump’s re-election.
Recent analysis by Nikkei Asia suggests that the Chinese Communist regime broke the tradition of delaying the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee for almost half a year. Originally, the Fourth Plenum was scheduled for the autumn of next year, but in response to the U.S. election results, it may be brought forward for strategic adjustments either before or after the inauguration of the next U.S. president in January or after the CCP’s Two Sessions in March. The article stated that the CCP wants to learn from the bitter lesson of the unexpected election of Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
However, Gong Xiangsheng believes that since the Third Plenum has already been held this year, the CCP is likely to convene the Fourth Plenum according to its own schedule, without being influenced by the results of the U.S. election.
Lai Rongwei believes there is a possibility of an early convening of the Fourth Plenum because Xi Jinping’s rule has been chaotic, especially after the 20th CPC Central Committee. The existing political rules within the CCP hierarchy are no longer applicable for analyzing the situation.
“Nowadays, the Chinese Communist high-level faction cannot be understood from an institutionalized perspective, but rather through so-called clandestine meetings. Perhaps the leadership in Zhongnanhai has convened many secret meetings. Although Xi Jinping seems to hold the highest position, is there a gathering of anti-Xi voices? Are they limiting him? This is a significant question.”
However, he believes that whether or not the Central Plenum is convened is not important, but rather whether Xi Jinping’s personal will permeates through the entire CCP regime is crucial.
Ding Shufan, honorary professor at the School of International Affairs at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, told Epoch Times that the CCP has never convened a Central Committee meeting specifically because of its relations with another country, but there are intense discussions internally leading to adjustments in its foreign policy. In the fall of 2013, a special conference on neighboring diplomacy was held, but not in the form of the Central Committee.
From August 15th to 16th, the China-U.S. Financial Working Group held a meeting in Shanghai, marking the fifth bilateral meeting since its establishment in September last year.
The Financial Working Group is one of two working groups established by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in September last year, co-led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Financial Affairs Brent Neiman and People’s Bank of China Vice Governor Xuan Changneng. The Financial Working Group reports directly to Secretary Yellen and Vice Premier He Lifeng.
The article by Nikkei Asia suggests that the current government under Xi Jinping lacks a key figure knowledgeable about U.S. affairs (a China expert). Vice Premier Liu He, who has long been responsible for macroeconomic policies and U.S. economic relations, studied in the U.S. and has acquaintances there. Liu He played a crucial role in reaching the “phase one” trade agreement with the Trump administration. Liu He is one of Xi’s trusted aides but is one of the few U.S. experts around Xi. Currently, there is no influential U.S. expert among Xi’s close aides.
American Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited China in July last year. The CCP state media Global Times quoted foreign media reports mentioning that Liu He, as the head of the Central Finance and Economic Leading Group, met with Yellen, but days later, Liu He’s director title was removed from the report, and eventually changed to “former director.”
There were reports that after stepping down from all positions, Liu He continued to participate in internal meetings on economic affairs of the CCP government and held significant influence. This is believed to be due to Xi’s concerns about the current situation.
Gong Xiangsheng believes that the decision-making circle within the CCP has narrowed significantly to Xi’s close confidants, so it is not a lack of a “China expert,” but rather among Xi’s trusted aides, there is no longer a “China expert.” Former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi understood the U.S., but was later removed. Although He Lifeng is also a trusted associate of Xi, he has professional experience in the National Development and Reform Commission, but cannot be compared to Liu He.
Gong Xiangsheng believes that although the CCP has long-serving professional diplomats and economic bureaucrats in the U.S., they are not individuals within Xi’s trusted circle. This will lead to Xi always having a wishful thinking approach to decision-making regarding the U.S., which can be seen since the start of the U.S.-China trade war.
Ding Shufan believes that China should not lack “China experts.” Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of Chinese students have been studying in the U.S. every year, with more than half of them staying in the U.S. for work after completing their studies. It should be said that Xi Jinping’s dislike of America has led to a domino effect, with many people in China starting to reject those returning from overseas.
“He Lifeng took over from Liu He at the worst time in China-U.S. economic relations. If Xi Jinping still emphasizes ‘state advancement and people’s retreat,’ controlling everything about the party and the country’s economy, He Lifeng cannot and does not need to negotiate with the U.S.”
Lai Rongwei believes that the political careers of He Lifeng and Liu He do not depend on how well they implement their policies, but on their need to please Xi Jinping. In fact, Liu He didn’t do very well in office either. It was only because he had spent time in the U.S. and had been in charge of the economy for a long time during Li Keqiang’s era, which was more similar to the spirit of a market economy.
He stated that the current Premier Li Keqiang is also considered a proponent of a market economy with experience from Wenzhou, but he has not had his own voice since taking office. “The top leadership of the CCP may have China experts, but Xi Jinping cannot trust or promote these China experts.”
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Vice Premier He Lifeng, State Councillor Chen Yiqin, and even Army Commander Li Qiaoming and other senior officials have recently made intensive visits to Russia. Does this recent intense engagement with Russia by senior CCP officials ahead of the U.S. election represent a signal of further deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations?
Gong Xiangsheng believes that Sino-Russian relations will only grow closer under the circumstances of a common “enemy” in the United States, and both sides huddling together is an inevitable strategic choice.
Lai Rongwei stated that the CCP wants to change the current international order, not only cozying up to Russia but also constantly wooing so-called developing countries, similar to the concept of “surrounding the cities from rural areas.”
He said that while the CCP is getting along with Russia, there are contradictions between China and Russia. Putin is not happy with the CCP’s efforts to co-opt the influence in Russia, but Russia is currently at war and facing sanctions from Western societies, and needs help from China. Both countries are looking to balance the United States.
Ding Shufan believes that Xi Jinping wants to break away from U.S. influence and establish influence worldwide. Therefore, he does not care about lacking China experts; conversely, being a China expert requires self-censorship. Xi’s policies appear to be pushing China and Russia closer, forming a group to counter the U.S.